Atidium

Private Key Leakage

Estimated loss

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VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE

Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.

▰ METHOD

PRIVATE KEY

PRIVATE-KEY

Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

Forensic narrative

EOS Atidium's official account wwwatidiumio was abnormal. A total of 6 tokens including ATD tokens 337,759,004 were transferred to account b4jmqvvktgjx. The account then transferred 130 million ATD tokens to Newdex Exchange for cash, a total of 3,183.8564 EOS were profitable.. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: 3,183 EOS.

Primary source

https://www.jinse.com/lives/67820.htm ↗

Sourced from

slowmist

Technical record