Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Reproducible Foundry test fork from SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs. Clone the repo, run forge test against the file path above, and replay the exploit against a mainnet fork at the historical block. Use for reproduction only — not for live targets.
The DeFi protocol Balancer V2 suffered a vulnerability exploit that affected its Composable Stable Pools. The root cause of the incident was an incorrect rounding direction in the Stable Pool’s “exact-out” swap path. This flaw was amplified under conditions of precision errors introduced by rate providers and extremely low liquidity, allowing the attacker to manipulate the invariant and distort the BPT price calculation. As a result, the attacker was able to withdraw large amounts of assets from the pool at a cost far below their real value.The attack caused a total loss of $121.1 million across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, Optimism, and Polygon. As of November 19, coordinated mitigation efforts enabled several security measures to be deployed promptly after the issue was discovered, resulting in approximately $45.7 million in user funds being protected or recovered. Attack method (per SlowMist): Business Logic Flaw. Reported loss: $ 121,100,000.
- chain
- ethereum
- protocol
- Balancer V2
- bug_class
- logic
- date_occurred
- 2025-11-03
- loss_usd
- $121,100,000
- source_id
- sm:balancer-v2::2025-11-03