VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
The Bancor platform theft was related to the BancorConverter contract, and the attacker (hacker/mole) is very likely to get the private key of the 0x009bb5e9fcf28e5e601b7d0e9e821da6365d0a9c. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: 24,984 ETH,3,236,967 BNT,229,356,645 NPXS,.
Primary source
https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/39758950 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Bancor
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2018-07-10
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:bancor::2018-07-10
Related — same bug class· private-key