VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
According to the announcement from BingX, at around 4 AM Singapore time on September 20, BingX's security systems detected an unauthorized intrusion targeting one of their hot wallets. Attack method (per SlowMist): Unknown. Reported loss: $ 45,000,000.
Primary source
https://x.com/Vivien_BingX/status/1836940851873992845 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- BingX
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2024-09-20
- loss_usd
- $45,000,000
- source_id
- sm:bingx::2024-09-20
Related — same bug class· private-key