VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
Bitcoin exchange Bitfloor suspended operations after the theft of $250,000. The founder Roman Shtylman explained in a post on the Bitcoin Forum that an attacker obtained an unencrypted backup of exchange wallet keys and used these keys to transfer "BitFloor on hand" Most of the coins he held," Shtilman later locked this part of the money at around 24,000 BTC. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: 24,000 BTC.
Primary source
https://www.tl80.cn/article/69040 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- bitcoin
- protocol
- Bitfloor
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2012-09-05
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:bitfloor::2012-09-05
Related — same bug class· private-key