VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
The attacker stole $30 million worth of cryptocurrency from Bithumb, Korea's largest cryptocurrency exchange. According to Japanese Cointelegraph, the attackers hijacked Bithumb's popular (online) wallet. Attack method (per SlowMist): Wallet Stolen. Reported loss: 30,000,000 USD.
Primary source
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/19/south-korea-crypto-exchange-bithumb-says-it-was-hacked-coins-stolen.html ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Bithumb
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2018-06-21
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:bithumb::2018-06-21
Related — same bug class· private-key