VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
On July 12, Japan's BitPoint Japan (BPJ) exchange was hacked, and 3.5 billion yen (32 million U.S. dollars) worth of cryptocurrency in the hot wallet was stolen. After that, BPJ shut down all services of the exchange. On the 14th, BPJ announced the recovery of some stolen cryptocurrencies from overseas trading systems, reducing the total loss to 3.02 billion yen (customer funds 2.06 billion, BPJ own funds 960 million). Attack method (per SlowMist): Wallet Stolen. Reported loss: $ 27,610,000.
Primary source
https://www.zdnet.com/article/bitpoint-cryptocurrency-exchange-hacked-for-32-million/ ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- BitPoint
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2019-07-12
- loss_usd
- $27,610,000
- source_id
- sm:bitpoint::2019-07-12
Related — same bug class· private-key