Bitrue

Wallet Stolen

Estimated loss

—

VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE

Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.

▰ METHOD

PRIVATE KEY

PRIVATE-KEY

Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

Forensic narrative

At approximately 1am June 27 (GMT+8), a hacker exploited a vulnerability in Bitrue's Risk Control team's 2nd review process to access the personal funds of about 90 Bitrue users. The hacker used what they learned from this breach to then access the Bitrue hot wallet and move 9.3 million XRP and 2.5 million ADA to different exchanges. Attack method (per SlowMist): Wallet Stolen. Reported loss: 4520500.

Primary source

https://www.jinse.com/lives/104224.htm ↗

Sourced from

slowmist

Technical record