VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
On February 18, 2025, Abstract discovered a security incident involving the Cardex app within The Portal, affecting approximately 9,000 wallets with a total loss of around $400,000 in ETH. A leaked key in Cardex's frontend code led to the compromise of the session signer wallet. Since this wallet was shared across all sessions, all users who had created sessions on Cardex were impacted. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: $ 400,000.
Primary source
https://x.com/0xCygaar/status/1891948692204368122 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Cardex
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2025-02-18
- loss_usd
- $400,000
- source_id
- sm:cardex::2025-02-18
Related — same bug class· private-key