CertiK

Account Compromise

Estimated loss

—

VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE

Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.

▰ METHOD

PRIVATE KEY

PRIVATE-KEY

Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

Forensic narrative

The Twitter account of the security firm CertiK was compromised. The attackers posted false information claiming that the Uniswap router contract is vulnerable to a reentrancy attack, along with phishing links. Subsequently, CertiK tweeted that "A verified account, associated with a well-known media, contacted one of our employees. Unfortunately, it appears that this account was compromised, leading to a phishing attack on our employee. " Attack method (per SlowMist): Account Compromise. Reported loss: -.

Primary source

https://twitter.com/CertiK/status/1743252309662912937 ↗

Sourced from

slowmist

Technical record