Cetus CLMM

Cetus's CLMM math library on Sui contained a flawed overflow guard inside `checked_shlw` (checked shift-left-word) used by `get_delta_a` / `get_delta_b` in the `integer_mate` fixed-point u256 routines. The function compared the input against an incorrect constant — effectively `1 << 192` was checked the wrong direction with the wrong mask — so high-bit-set inputs slipped past the guard and the subsequent left-shift silently wrapped, producing a near-zero token-delta requirement for a position with massive liquidity credit. The attacker flash-loaned haSUI, drove the pool to a price tick where one side of the range required only `1` unit of a spoof token (BULLA, MOJO), opened a CLMM position consuming the overflow path so the protocol charged ~1 token unit for outsized liquidity, then redeemed real reserves across pools. ~$223M drained; Sui validators froze ~$162M before bridging.