VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
Cocos-BCX has verified with the exchange, conducted internal investigations and concluded that asset loss and malicious selling that occurred are due to the malicious theft of the mapping wallet information. After verifying and confirming with the exchange, the total amount of stolen tokens this time was 1,087,522,819.2 COCOS, and the exchange confirmed that this total amount has been sold. Attack method (per SlowMist): Wallet Stolen. Reported loss: 1,087,522,819.2 COCOS.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Cocos-BCX
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2020-04-03
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:cocos-bcx::2020-04-03
Related — same bug class· private-key