VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
Unidentified assailants stole 523 million NEM coins (about $534 million) from the exchange's hot wallet. According to Coincheck, NEM coins are kept on a single-signature hot wallet instead of a more secure multi-signature wallet, and the stolen coins are confirmed to be Coincheck customers. Attack method (per SlowMist): Wallet Stolen. Reported loss: 534,000,000 USD.
Primary source
https://fortune.com/2018/01/31/coincheck-hack-how/ ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Coincheck
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2018-01-26
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:coincheck::2018-01-26
Related — same bug class· private-key