VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
On November 8, a hacker breached the CoinPoker’s hot wallet, resulting in the unauthorized draining of approximately $2M USD. The attack spanned across multiple blockchain networks, including BNB Chain, Ethereum, and Polygon networks. Later, it funneled through Tornado Cash to obscure the trail and to launder the funds. Attack method (per SlowMist): Third-party Vulnerability. Reported loss: $ 2,000,000.
Primary source
https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/?id=coinpoker-hack ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- ethereum
- protocol
- CoinPoker
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2024-11-08
- loss_usd
- $2,000,000
- source_id
- sm:coinpoker::2024-11-08
Related — same bug class· private-key