VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
A failed cold storage restoration exercise seems to have exposed private keys intended for offline storage (effectively making them online). However, the CEO has expressed an insider’s involvement. Police found private keys exposed online for more than 12 hours. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: 438 BTC.
Primary source
http://archive.is/AZnGe ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- COINSECURE
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2018-04-12
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:coinsecure::2018-04-12
Related — same bug class· private-key