Compound Labs

Account Compromise

Estimated loss

—

VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE

Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.

▰ METHOD

PRIVATE KEY

PRIVATE-KEY

Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

▰ PROOF OF CONCEPT

DEFIHACKLABS

src/test/2023-12/GoodCompound_exp.sol

view forked test on github ↗

Reproducible Foundry test fork from SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs. Clone the repo, run forge test against the file path above, and replay the exploit against a mainnet fork at the historical block. Use for reproduction only — not for live targets.

Forensic narrative

DeFi lending protocol Compound Labs tweeted that their account was compromised yesterday for ~4 hours until they regained control of the account and removed the spam messages. Attack method (per SlowMist): Account Compromise. Reported loss: -.

Primary source

https://twitter.com/compoundfinance/status/1741012550958080239 ↗

Sourced from

slowmist

Technical record