VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
The ownership of the MEV infrastructure Eden Network deployer address was hacked and took control of the EDEN token contract. The attacker claims that a new token contract will be deployed, and Eden Network can redeem ownership after purchasing 200 ETH of NEDEN. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: -.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Eden Network
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2022-10-29
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:eden-network::2022-10-29
Related — same bug class· private-key