ChainBleedv0.1 · open intel
← back to feed·FLASHLOAN2023-03-13 · 3y ago
Incident · SLOWMIST

Euler Finance

Flash Loan Attack
Estimated loss
$197.00M
VERDICT —UNRATED
Verdict pending. Auto-ingested incidents are reviewed before a public verdict is rendered.
▰ METHOD
FLASHLOAN
FLASHLOANBYTECODE CATCHABLEAI SCANNABLE
Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

▰ PROOF OF CONCEPT
DEFIHACKLABS
src/test/2023-03/Euler_exp.sol
view forked test on github ↗

Reproducible Foundry test fork from SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs. Clone the repo, run forge test against the file path above, and replay the exploit against a mainnet fork at the historical block. Use for reproduction only — not for live targets.

Forensic narrative

The DeFi lending protocol Euler Finance was attacked, and the attackers made a profit of about 197 million US dollars. The attacker used flashloans to deposit funds and then leveraged them twice to trigger the liquidation logic, donating the funds to the reserve address and conducting a self-liquidation to collect any remaining assets. Two key factors contributed to the success of the attack: 1. Funds were donated to the reserved address without being subjected to a liquidity check. This created a mechanism that could directly trigger soft liquidation. 2. When the soft liquidation logic was triggered by high leverage, the yield value increased, enabling the liquidator to obtain most of the collateral funds from the liquidated user's account by transferring only a portion of the liabilities to themselves. Given that the value of the collateral funds exceeded the value of the liabilities (which were only partially transferred due to the soft liquidation), the liquidator was able to successfully pass their health factor check (checkLiquidity) and withdraw the obtained funds. On April 4th, Euler Labs tweeted that after a successful negotiation, the attacker has returned all the funds stolen from the agreement on March 13th, because the attacker has returned the funds, the $1 million reward campaign launched by the foundation No new information will be accepted. Attack method (per SlowMist): Flash Loan Attack. Reported loss: $ 197,000,000.

Primary source
https://twitter.com/SlowMist_Team/status/1635288963580825606
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
chain
protocol
Euler Finance
bug_class
flashloan
date_occurred
2023-03-13
loss_usd
$197,000,000
source_id
sm:euler-finance::2023-03-13
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