VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
Exzo Network tweeted that a recent security breach targeted Exzo ($XZO), resulting from a compromised owner/admin account. The malicious group utilized the compromised admin wallet to transfer the 'ownership' role of Exzo ($XZO) to their wallet, enabling them to mint a substantial amount of $XZO and drain 169 ETH from the XZO/ETH liquidity pool on Uniswap. The attackers also transferred a total of 69 ETH and the remaining XZO in the admin wallet to their own wallet(s). Attack method (per SlowMist): Wallet Stolen. Reported loss: $ 470,498.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Exzo Network
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2023-11-14
- loss_usd
- $470,498
- source_id
- sm:exzo-network::2023-11-14
Related — same bug class· private-key