VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
Decentralized derivatives trading platform FutureSwap tweeted that an account with around 300,000 FST reward reserves (0.3% of supply) was compromised yesterday. The credentials for this account were compromised by human error, and the attacker was able to gain access on Arbitrum and transfer the available reward FST to himself. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: 300,000 FST.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- arbitrum
- protocol
- FutureSwap
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2022-02-11
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:futureswap::2022-02-11
Related — same bug class· private-key