VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
On May 20, 2024, the Web3 gaming platform Gala Games was attacked, resulting in a loss of approximately $21.8 million. The attacker minted 5 billion GALA tokens, worth over $200 million, and quickly sold 592 million GALA, receiving 5,952 ETH. On May 22, according to on-chain records and a statement from Gala Games on Discord, the digital wallet associated with the Gala Games hacker transferred 5,913.2 ETH, which was the hacker returning the stolen funds. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: $ 21,800,000.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Gala Games
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2024-05-20
- loss_usd
- $21,800,000
- source_id
- sm:gala-games::2024-05-20
Related — same bug class· private-key