VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
The attacker controls some of the GateHub database account API permissions, but the user's private key is secure. GateHub officials have identified 103 wallets that were compromised and a total of 18,473 accounts that may have been affected, including 5,045 with active balances. Attack method (per SlowMist): Permission Stolen. Reported loss: 23,200,000 XRP.
Primary source
https://www.jinse.com/lives/100522.htm ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- GateHub
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2019-06-01
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:gatehub::2019-06-01
Related — same bug class· private-key