VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
According to the official Twitter, the General Bytes encrypted currency ATM service was attacked on March 17 and 18. The attacker used the upload interface in the system to upload and run a malicious Java program, and then the attacker obtained the permissions of the database in the server and Hot wallet withdrawal API Key. According to SlowMist MistTrack, the loss was about $1.8 million. Attack method (per SlowMist): Malicious software. Reported loss: $ 1,800,000.
Primary source
https://generalbytes.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/ESD/pages/2885222430/Security+Incident+March+17-18th+2023 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- General Bytes
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2023-03-17
- loss_usd
- $1,800,000
- source_id
- sm:general-bytes::2023-03-17
Related — same bug class· private-key