VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
The attackers exploited a misconfigured LayerZero bridge along with a compromised private key for the GAIN BSC contract. By setting a malicious peer contract on Ethereum, they bypassed validation checks and minted 5 billion counterfeit GAIN tokens on BSC. The attackers then sold approximately 150 million of these counterfeit tokens (about 2.8% of the total fake supply) on PancakeSwap, cashing out around USD 3 million. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: $ 3,000,000.
Primary source
https://x.com/OliFeldmeier/status/1972367705023103244 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- ethereum
- protocol
- GriffinAI
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2025-09-24
- loss_usd
- $3,000,000
- source_id
- sm:griffinai::2025-09-24
Related — same bug class· private-key