Hedgey

Hedgey's `ClaimCampaigns.createLockedCampaign()` accepted a `Campaign` struct, a `ClaimLockup`, and an array of `donor` allocations, then *did not pull the campaign funds in the same transaction* — it trusted that the caller's balance backed the eventual claims. The attacker used a flashloan to obtain the ERC-20 needed to satisfy any internal balance check at creation, called `createLockedCampaign`, immediately called `claim()` to drain the just-funded campaign back to themselves (or used the campaign's own approval pattern to pull funds), then repaid the flashloan. The transaction never required atomic funds-locked-equals-allocations, so the attacker manufactured a fully-funded campaign on borrowed liquidity and walked away with the protocol's tokens by claiming as a beneficiary. The bug was duplicated across multiple chains (Ethereum, Arbitrum, Optimism, Polygon, Base) because the same `ClaimCampaigns` contract was deployed on each.

Reproducible Foundry test fork from SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs. Clone the repo, run forge test against the file path above, and replay the exploit against a mainnet fork at the historical block. Use for reproduction only — not for live targets.