VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
A large number of HVTs in the AirDropsDAC contract account were transferred to the sym111111add account under abnormal operation, the account was then exchanged for 2,514 EOS at Newdex, which was subsequently transferred to the gizdkmjvhege account. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: 2,514 EOS.
Primary source
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/DnhtzdWeRziK030FSolDbA ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- HireVibes & AirDropsDAC
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2018-11-12
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:hirevibes-airdropsdac::2018-11-12
Related — same bug class· private-key