VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
ZK startup Lagrange's X account has been allegedly compromised, and a scam link related to the LGR token has been posted. Please stay vigilant and be cautious of potential risks. Attack method (per SlowMist): Account Compromise. Reported loss: -.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Lagrange
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2024-10-17
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:lagrange::2024-10-17
Related — same bug class· private-key