Mango Markets V3

Mango Markets V3 priced cross-margin collateral using a Pyth/Switchboard-style oracle whose MNGO/USD feed was sourced from a small set of low-liquidity spot venues (FTX, Ascendex, Serum). The attacker opened ~$10M of MNGO-PERP long on one Mango account and an equal short on another, then bought MNGO across those underlying venues with ~$4M, pumping the oracle price ~13x within minutes. The unrealized PnL on the long position was treated as instantly-withdrawable collateral by Mango's risk engine (no time-weighting, no liquidity-adjusted haircut, no per-asset borrow cap proportional to insurance fund). The attacker borrowed ~$115M against the inflated balance and withdrew across BTC, ETH, SOL, USDC, USDT, MSOL — every asset in the protocol. The root cause is a risk-parameter design flaw: an illiquid governance token whose entire float was thinner than the borrow capacity it backstopped, combined with a spot oracle that had no manipulation resistance.