VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
On October 6th, MCT issued an announcement stating that in the past two days, some users had reported cases of their MCT wallets being compromised. After investigation today, it was discovered that due to the DNS domain hijacking, under certain specific conditions, private keys could potentially be uploaded to a fraudulent domain. MCT advises users who have entered their private keys into MCT since September 15, 2023, to transfer their wallet balances as a precautionary measure as soon as possible. Attack method (per SlowMist): Domain Hijacking. Reported loss: -.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- MCT
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2023-10-06
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:mct::2023-10-06
Related — same bug class· private-key