VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
According to Moby Post-Mortem Report, on January 8, an attacker took control of the Private Key used to authorize upgrades to Moby’s core contracts, compromising the protocol. This led to the exposure of 3.77 wBTC, 207.76 wETH, and 1,500,351.5 USDC in the sOLP and mOLP liquidity pools. Of the stolen funds, 1,470,091.74 USDC was recovered with the assistance of Seal911 team. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: $ 2,500,000.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Moby
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2025-01-08
- loss_usd
- $2,500,000
- source_id
- sm:moby::2025-01-08
Related — same bug class· private-key