VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
Many DeFi protocol websites on BSC (Binance Smart Chain) were attacked by DNS, including Cream Finance and BSC header DEX PancakeSwap. The attacker requested users to submit personal private keys or mnemonics through the website. The relevant project team has passed Twitter Remind users not to visit the website and do not submit information such as private keys. Later PancakeSwap and Cream Finance both stated that they had regained access to DNS. Attack method (per SlowMist): DNS attack. Reported loss: -.
Primary source
https://www.sohu.com/a/455998320_100217347 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- bsc
- protocol
- Multiple DeFi protocols
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2021-03-15
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:multiple-defi-protocols::2021-03-15
Related — same bug class· private-key