ChainBleedv0.1 · open intel
← back to feed·ETH2022-06-09 · 4y ago
Incident · SLOWMIST

Optimism

Multi-signature address transfer vulnerability
Estimated loss
VERDICT —UNRATED
Verdict pending. Auto-ingested incidents are reviewed before a public verdict is rendered.
▰ METHOD
Undisclosed
Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

▰ PROOF OF CONCEPT
DEFIHACKLABS
src/test/2022-06/Optimism_exp.sol
view forked test on github ↗

Reproducible Foundry test fork from SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs. Clone the repo, run forge test against the file path above, and replay the exploit against a mainnet fork at the historical block. Use for reproduction only — not for live targets.

Forensic narrative

Optimism and Wintermute both released announcements, disclosing to the community a loss of 20 million OP tokens. At the time of the release of OP tokens, Optimism entrusted Wintermute to provide liquidity services for OP in the secondary market. As part of the agreement, Optimism will provide Wintermute with 20 million OP tokens. To receive the tokens, Wintermute gave Optimism a multi-signature address, to which Optimism transferred 20 million OPs after Optimism test sent two transactions and Wintermute confirmed it was correct. After Optimism transferred the coins, Wintermute found that they had no way to control these coins, because the multi-signature addresses they provided were only deployed on the Ethereum mainnet for the time being and have not yet been deployed to the Optimism network. To gain control of these tokens, Wintermute immediately initiated remediation operations. However, attackers have already noticed this vulnerability and deployed multi-signature to this address on the Optimism network before Wintermute, successfully controlling the 20 million tokens. At present, the Optimism hacker has returned 17 million OP tokens and transferred 1 million OP to the Vitalik address, and Vitalik has returned the funds. Attack method (per SlowMist): Multi-signature address transfer vulnerability. Reported loss: 2,000,000 OP.

Primary source
https://twitter.com/optimismPBC/status/1534631766576836608
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
chain
ethereum
protocol
Optimism
bug_class
unknown
date_occurred
2022-06-09
loss_usd
source_id
sm:optimism::2022-06-09
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