VERDICT —UNRATED
Verdict pending. Auto-ingested incidents are reviewed before a public verdict is rendered.
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
▰ PROOF OF CONCEPT
DEFIHACKLABS
src/test/2023-02/Platypus_exp.sol
view forked test on github ↗Reproducible Foundry test fork from SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs. Clone the repo, run forge test against the file path above, and replay the exploit against a mainnet fork at the historical block. Use for reproduction only — not for live targets.
Forensic narrative
The $8 million Platypus flash loan attack was made possible because of code that was in the wrong order, according to a post-mortem report from Platypus auditor Omniscia. The auditing company claims the problematic code didn’t exist in the version they audited. Reported loss: $8,000,000.
Primary source
https://cointelegraph.com/news/platypus-attack-exploited-incorrect-ordering-of-code-auditor-claims ↗Sourced from
chainsec
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Platypus
- bug_class
- flashloan
- date_occurred
- 2023-02-17
- loss_usd
- $8,000,000
- source_id
- cs:platypus::2023-02-17
Related — same bug class· flashloan