VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
Layer1 blockchain QANplatform (QANX), which is resistant to quantum computing attacks, tweeted that its smart contract cross-chain bridge was attacked, and the attacker managed to extract tokens, reminding users not to perform any transactions related to QANX tokens. According to the findings, the hackers obtained the private keys to the bridge wallet and withdrew more than 1.4 billion QANX tokens worth more than $1 million in two transactions. Attack method (per SlowMist): Profanity Vulnerability. Reported loss: $ 2,000,000.
Primary source
https://medium.com/qanplatform/qanx-bridge-wallet-disclosure-analysis-continuously-updated-724121bbbf9a ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- QANplatform
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2022-10-11
- loss_usd
- $2,000,000
- source_id
- sm:qanplatform::2022-10-11
Related — same bug class· private-key