VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
On May 18, QANX Bridge was attacked between 15:01:40 and 18:20:25 UTC. Developers can withdraw 100,450,000 QANX from QANX Bridge and sell it on Uniswap for 325 ETH, then transfer it to Tornado Cash. By May 26, the hackers had sold all the stolen QANX tokens. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: 100,450,000 QANX.
Primary source
https://medium.com/qanplatform/qanx-bridge-disclosure-analysis-continuously-updated-849f7a91d05e ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- QANX Bridge
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2022-05-18
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:qanx-bridge::2022-05-18
Related — same bug class· private-key