Raydium

Private Key Leakage

Estimated loss

$4.39M

VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE

Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.

▰ METHOD

PRIVATE KEY

PRIVATE-KEY

Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

Forensic narrative

In response to an attack, Raydium tweeted that a patch has been put in place so far to prevent further attacks. This attack has nothing to do with the escalated privileges of the program itself. The vulnerability seems to stem from a Trojan horse attack and the leakage of the private key of the liquidity pool owner account. The attacker gained access to the pool owner account and was then able to call the withdraw pnl function, which is used to collect transaction/protocol fees earned on swaps in the pool. The affected pools include SOL-USDC, SOL-USDT, RAY-USDC, RAY-USDT, RAY-SOL, stSOL-USDC, ZBC-USDC, UXP-USDC, and whETH-USDC, with a total loss of approximately $4.395 million. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: $ 4,395,000.

Primary source

https://twitter.com/RaydiumProtocol/status/1603860540153028625 ↗

Sourced from

slowmist

Technical record