VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
The Base ecological project RocketSwap was attacked. The attacker cross-chained the stolen assets to Ethereum, resulting in a loss of 471 ETH (approximately $868,000). RocketSwap said: "The team needs to use offline signatures and put the private key on the server when deploying Launchpad. It is currently detected that the server has been brute-forced, and because the farm contract uses a proxy contract, there are multiple high-risk permissions that lead to the transfer of farm assets." Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: 471 ETH.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- ethereum
- protocol
- RocketSwap
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2023-08-15
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:rocketswap::2023-08-15
Related — same bug class· private-key