Rubic

Private Key Leakage

Estimated loss

$1.20M

VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE

Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.

▰ METHOD

PRIVATE KEY

PRIVATE-KEY

Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

▰ PROOF OF CONCEPT

DEFIHACKLABS

src/test/2022-12/Rubic_exp.sol

view forked test on github ↗

Reproducible Foundry test fork from SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs. Clone the repo, run forge test against the file path above, and replay the exploit against a mainnet fork at the historical block. Use for reproduction only — not for live targets.

Forensic narrative

The multi-chain exchange protocol Rubic tweeted that an administrator’s wallet address, which manages the RBC/BRBC cross-chain bridge and staking rewards, was stolen, and the team suspected that malware stole the private key. The attacker sold about 34 million RBC/BRBC on Uniswap and PancakeSwap, the user's staking funds are safe and the smart contract is not exploited. Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: $ 1,200,000.

Primary source

https://twitter.com/CryptoRubic/status/1587704890800889858 ↗

Sourced from

slowmist

Technical record