VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
▰ PROOF OF CONCEPT
DEFIHACKLABS
src/test/2022-12/Rubic_exp.sol
view forked test on github ↗Reproducible Foundry test fork from SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs. Clone the repo, run forge test against the file path above, and replay the exploit against a mainnet fork at the historical block. Use for reproduction only — not for live targets.
Forensic narrative
Rubic, a service that allows users to swap cryptocurrencies between different exchanges, was exploited earlier Wednesday after attackers gained access to the private keys of an administrator’s wallet. Reported loss: $1,000,000.
Sourced from
chainsec
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Rubic
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2022-12-25
- loss_usd
- $1,000,000
- source_id
- cs:rubic::2022-12-25
Related — same bug class· private-key