SEC

Account Compromise

Estimated loss

—

VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE

Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.

▰ METHOD

PRIVATE KEY

PRIVATE-KEY

Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

Forensic narrative

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated on Monday in a release that its Twitter account was compromised on January 9th due to an unauthorized party gaining control of the associated phone number through a "SIM card swap" attack. After gaining control of the phone number, the unauthorized party reset the password for the SEC's Twitter account. Access to the phone number was obtained through the telecommunications provider, not through the SEC's systems. Attack method (per SlowMist): Account Compromise. Reported loss: -.

Primary source

https://www.theblock.co/post/273847/sec-says-multi-factor-authentication-had-been-turned-off-in-run-up-to-false-x-post-about-bitcoin-etf-approval ↗

Sourced from

slowmist

Technical record