VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
Wayne, the co-founder of the NFT game Tales of Elleria, tweeted early this morning: "The bridge contract of Tales of Elleria was exploited, causing its LP to be depleted and losing more than $280,000. The attacker seems to have generated his own signature , and extracted a large amount of ELM tokens, draining the LP. The current findings suspect that the hacker exploited the ecrecover function and was able to generate authorized signatures without our private key." Attack method (per SlowMist): Contract Vulnerability. Reported loss: $ 280,000.
Primary source
https://twitter.com/crwy__/status/1648776712157794312 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Tales of Elleria
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2023-04-20
- loss_usd
- $280,000
- source_id
- sm:tales-of-elleria::2023-04-20
Related — same bug class· private-key