VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
Derivatives marketplace Thales issued an announcement that a core contributor’s PC/Metamask had been hacked and that some hot wallets acting as casual deployers ($25k) or admin bots ($10k) had been compromised. Do not interact with any Thalesmarket contracts on the BNB Chain and revoke any contracts that are pending approval. All funds are safe on Optimism, Arbitrum, Polygon and Base. Thales said that due to the attack, support for the BSC will be officially dropped. Attack method (per SlowMist): Information Leakage. Reported loss: $ 35,000.
Primary source
https://twitter.com/thalesmarket/status/1692935883521953997?s=46&t=DLwbX9Nw4QECiyZQ0av-fg ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- bsc
- protocol
- Thales
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2023-08-20
- loss_usd
- $35,000
- source_id
- sm:thales::2023-08-20
Related — same bug class· private-key