VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
The Web3 Twitter marketing platform Twity tweeted that there was a security vulnerability in its system, the Telegram account of the technician was leaked, and the chat record contained project information and wallet private key, resulting in the disclosure of administrator account information. The team is currently holding an emergency meeting to study solutions. All user assets and NFT information will be snapped. The specific solution will be published separately after it is formulated. Attack method (per SlowMist): Telegram was hacked. Reported loss: -.
Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Twity
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2023-01-08
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:twity::2023-01-08
Related — same bug class· private-key