UGC

Account Compromise

Estimated loss

—

VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE

Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.

▰ METHOD

PRIVATE KEY

PRIVATE-KEY

Root cause

Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.

Forensic narrative

The Education Grants Council (UGC) of India was hacked, the hackers used the Twitter account to post a fake Azuki NFT airdrop link and changed the profile to the Azuki NFT co-creator, replacing the avatar with an Azuki-related image. The agency recovered the account after it was held hostage for six hours. Attack method (per SlowMist): Account Compromise. Reported loss: -.

Primary source

https://forkast.news/headlines/twitter-hacker-fake-azuki-nft/ ↗

Sourced from

slowmist

Technical record