VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
South Korean exchange Upbit 342,000 ETH worth about $50 million was stolen. The exchange’s alleged theft occurred while assets were being transferred between hot and cold storage wallets, leading some to speculate that the incident may have been an internal job rather than an external breach. On January 14, 2025, the United States, Japan, and South Korea mentioned in a joint statement that the Upbit theft was attributed to DPRK. Attack method (per SlowMist): Wallet Stolen. Reported loss: 342,000 ETH.
Primary source
https://cointelegraph.com/news/upbit-hack-stolen-eth-worth-millions-on-the-move-to-unknown-wallets ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Upbit
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2019-11-27
- loss_usd
- —
- source_id
- sm:upbit::2019-11-27
Related — same bug class· private-key