VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
The ZB exchange was hacked with a total loss of around $4.3 million. ZB has notified the community on August 2 that deposits and withdrawals will be suspended due to a "sudden failure". The reason is "Sudden failure of the core application". It's worth noting that the attack actually happened on August 1, but it was overshadowed by the overwhelming news of the Nomad exploit. Attack method (per SlowMist): Wallet Stolen. Reported loss: $ 4,300,000.
Primary source
https://news.cnyes.com/news/id/4925357 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- ZB
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2022-08-01
- loss_usd
- $4,300,000
- source_id
- sm:zb::2022-08-01
Related — same bug class· private-key