VERDICT —OUT OF SCOPE
Root cause is private-key / signer compromise — the on-chain contract behaved exactly as written. No pre-deployment source audit or bytecode review reaches the key-custody perimeter; this is operational-security territory (HSM/MPC hygiene, key rotation, hot-wallet isolation). Bytecode would show nothing wrong.
▰ METHOD
PRIVATE KEY
PRIVATE-KEY
Root cause
Root-cause analysis not yet published. The incident description below contains all currently available signal — review the attack transaction directly for definitive forensics.
Forensic narrative
RWA restaking platform Zoth suffered a $8.29 million hack after an attacker gained access to admin privileges that allowed them to modify the platform's smart contracts. The hacker "upgraded" the contract to a malicious version, then withdrew $8.45 million in USD0++, a token issued by the Usual protocol. After swapping the assets into various other tokens, they were left with 4,223 ETH (~$8.29 million). Attack method (per SlowMist): Private Key Leakage. Reported loss: $ 8,290,000.
Primary source
https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/1903020756830974217 ↗Sourced from
slowmist
Technical record
- chain
- —
- protocol
- Zoth
- bug_class
- private-key
- date_occurred
- 2025-03-21
- loss_usd
- $8,290,000
- source_id
- sm:zoth::2025-03-21
Related — same bug class· private-key